The Iraqi Chemical Weapons Program in Perspective [redacted]

Key Judgements
Information available as of 15 Novemeber 1984 was used in this report.

The successful use of lethal chemical weapons by Iraq in a conventional war is the culmination of 20 years of effort by Baghdad to acquire or develop such weapons. The past decade has witnessed the success of their sustained and systematic effort to develop a state-of-the-art capability to manufacture chemical weapons against great political odds and despite economic sanctions in acquisition of requisite technology. The chemical warfare program has been a relatively cheap investment for Iraq. We estimate the program has cost slightly above $200 million in capital expenditures over the same period. The program occupies about the same order of magnitude in dollars and research and development effort as the Iraqi nuclear program [redacted]

Iraq has managed to obtain needed assistance in research, training, and process technology from Soviet, West European, and other Middle Eastern sources. Without this foreign, particularly West European, assistance, we believe the Iraqis could not have developed chemical weapons. Help by the West German firm [redacted] has been especially critical [redacted] supplied technical expertise and equipment and has facilitated Iraqi contacts with other West European suppliers. Despite their continuing heavy involvement in Iraq’s chemical protective programs, we do not believe that the Soviets have been involved in the Iraqi effort to develop chemical weapons since the mid-1970s. At that time, the Iraqis excluded the Soviets from the Iraqi weapons program because of their dissatisfaction with Soviet prices and equipment and because the Iraqis had adequate support from the West European firms. [redacted]

We believe Iraq has made sufficient progress in its chemical weapons program to render it relatively immune from foreign pressures. US efforts to embargo Western equipment and precursor chemicals will slow the Iraqi chemical warfare program and impose greater costs but probably will not halt Iraq’s progress. Most production equipment is in place. Iraq is using numerous front companies and friendly Arab states to circumvent the Western embargo on precursor chemicals. Moreover, if the Western embargo proves effective and Iraq’s ability to procure supplies in Western Europe is ended, we believe the Iraqis could, with partial success, once again turn to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for all supplies of all but finished agent [redacted]

Chemical warfare probably will play an increasingly important role in the Iran-Iraq war. The Iraqis have successfully used chemical weapons in three separate battles beginning in August 1983 and will use chemical weapons on a wide scale in the event of another major Iranian attack. As Iraq acquires a larger stockpile of chemical weapons and more experience in their use, it will become extremely difficult for Iran to mount large-scale attacks against Iraqi territory. As a result, we believe Iran is making a major effort to develop its own chemical weapons. [redacted]

We estimate the Iraqis have a stockpile of several thousand bombs and artillery shells filled with mustard agent. They also probably have a few hundred bombs filled with the nerve agent tabun. By late 1985, this stockpile should increase significantly, barring only an Israeli airstrike on its main production facility. We estimate Iraq is capable of producing a maximum of 3 to 6 metric tons of mustard agent and 1 to 2 tons of tabun per day at its main production facility at Samarra. Sarin, a second-generation nerve agent, also is being produced in unknown quantity. The production rate for mustard and tabun at the research and development facility at Salman Pak is unknown but clearly less than at Samarra. [redacted]

The Iraqis have been careful to use chemical weapons only when the Iranians were on Iraqi territory. We believe Iraq will show restraint in using chemical weapons outside its borders, particularly against states such as Israel or Syria, which have chemical weapons stockpiles and adequate protective equipment of their own [redacted]

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The publicity accompanying Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and their relative cost-effectiveness probably will spur other Third World countries to develop chemical weapons. Iraq probably would be willing to provide chemical weapons or technology to friendly Arab states, although some countries, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in particular, would be unlikely to seek such weapons [redacted]

The lack of success in stopping the Iraqi program suggests that efforts to halt foreign chemical weapons programs must be taken early in the development phase. Once major equipment is delivered, the Iraqi experience suggests suppliers will forestall effective controls until their involvement in the program is completed. [redacted]